If I had a client trying to revoke or defend an acknowledgment of parentage (AOP) under the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA), I would be perplexed as to how to advise him or her. If you’ve read In re Moiles and Helton v Beaman, you’ll understand why. I’ll come back to those in a minute.
First, some context. When a child’s parents are not married before the child’s birth, the “natural father” has the option of establishing paternity by signing an AOP with the child’s mother (“natural father” is the statutory term). The AOP creates a legal relationship between the acknowledged father and child mirroring that of a child born or conceived during a marriage. The problem: the acknowledged father signing the AOP is sometimes not the child’s biological father—willful blindness, mistake, and/or deception are all culprits—and eventually, the biological parents may want to revoke the AOP. Under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, a court had to consider the equities of the case before revoking an AOP. So even if DNA showed that the acknowledged father was not the biological father, paternity might remain undisturbed.
The procedure for revoking an AOP was changed in 2012 by the RPA. Jim Ryan, who presented on the RPA at last year’s Family Law Institute, summarized the RPA’s pertinent provisions for me this way: “File a sufficient affidavit, obtain DNA tests, determine if the acknowledged father is the father, and revoke the AOP if he is not.” No more considering the equities of the case. According to Jim, “Acknowledged fathers are fighting the statute, fearing loss of their parenthood based upon a DNA test.”
Moiles and Helton were battleground cases for acknowledged fathers. In Moiles, the acknowledged father argued that DNA results were not enough to revoke the AOP because the RPA requires courts to first consider a child’s best interests. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the RPA best interest factors don’t apply when revoking an AOP. (The Michigan Supreme Court vacated this holding because, as Jim notes, “The case should have been dismissed upon a finding that the affidavit was not sufficient.”)
But Moiles doesn’t mean that DNA tests govern. At least not yet, anyway. Jim explains that even after the court of appeals decision in Moiles, the court in Helton “refused to rely upon the DNA results proving that the acknowledged father was not the biological father.” The lead opinion “improperly” incorporated the Child Custody Act best interest factors into the RPA and used these factors to deny revocation. Jim doesn’t think Helton is in line with the RPA, but because it is a published opinion, he says, “It will be difficult to correct.” However, Helton is a plurality opinion, so there may be room for creative arguments on both sides.
For a different perspective on Moiles and Helton, see 21.38 in Michigan Family Law. If you attended the Family Law Institute, you can access Jim’s materials on the RPA here. If you did not attend, you can still purchase the materials here.