The 2023–2024 U.S. Supreme Court term brought important rulings that have changed legal standards in several areas. These decisions affect rules on expert testimony in criminal cases, federal arbitration procedures, presidential power and immunity, and much more. Below are summaries of key cases from this term.
Criminal
Diaz v United States, 602 US ___, 144 S Ct 1727 (2024)
In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling regarding FRE 704(b). This rule restricts expert witnesses in criminal cases from providing testimony on whether the defendant had a specific mental state that is an element of the crime. Delilah Diaz, charged with importing methamphetamine, argued she was unaware of the drugs in her car, thus invoking a “blind mule” defense. The government’s expert testified that most drug couriers are aware of the presence of the drugs they transport, which Diaz contested as a violation of Rule 704(b).
The Supreme Court held that the expert’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) because he spoke about his general knowledge of drug couriers and did not directly comment on Diaz’s mental state. The Supreme Court concluded that such testimony does not usurp the jury’s role in determining the defendant’s specific mental state and thus upheld Diaz’s conviction. Therefore, the Court concluded that Rule 704(b) only prohibits direct opinions about the defendant’s mental state, not general observations about the behavior of most individuals in similar situations.
Chiaverini v City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 US ___, 144 S Ct 1745 (2024)
In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 USC 1983 against police officers from Napoleon, Ohio. Jascha Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, was charged with receiving stolen property, dealing in precious metals without a license, and money laundering. Upon arrest, Chiaverini was detained for three days before the charges were dropped by county prosecutors. Alleging that his arrest and detention were unjustified, Chiaverini filed a malicious prosecution claim under 42 USC 1983.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the police officers, a decision affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Without addressing whether the officers had probable cause concerning the money laundering charge, the Sixth Circuit held that as long as at least one charge had probable cause, in this case, charges of receiving stolen property and dealing in precious metals without a license, then any malicious prosecution claim regarding another charge must fail. The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the presence of probable cause for one criminal charge could categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim related to another charge lacking probable cause.
The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule and held that the existence of probable cause for one charge does not automatically shield officers from liability for charges lacking such cause. The Supreme Court reasoned that even if a detention is justified initially, it can become unreasonably prolonged, and if an invalid charge is the reason a detention begins or continues, it violates the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court also compared Chiaverini’s claims to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, emphasizing that a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the absence of probable cause for every charge, but rather for at least one charge.
In its holding, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case. This ruling reaffirms the protection against unreasonable seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and establishes that individuals detained under a mix of valid and invalid charges can pursue malicious prosecution claims for the unlawful aspects of their detention.
Smith v Arizona, No 22-899, ___ US ___ (June 21, 2024)
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when an expert relies on an absent analyst’s statements to support their opinion, the absent analyst’s statements are effectively admitted for their truth, triggering rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause. The case arose when the defendant faced drug-related charges after law enforcement found substantial quantities of drugs and related items in his possession. The state relied on forensic testing conducted by analyst Elizabeth Rast, who prepared detailed notes and a signed report on the tested substances. However, Rast ceased working at the lab before the trial, prompting the state to substitute another analyst, Greggory Longoni, to testify about the results and provide his opinion based on Rast’s findings.
The defendant challenged his conviction, arguing that allowing Longoni to convey Rast’s findings violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because Rast was unavailable for cross-examination. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Smith’s claim, asserting that Rast’s statements were introduced not for their truth but merely to explain the basis of Longoni’s expert opinions, and therefore did not trigger the Confrontation Clause.
The Supreme Court held that when an expert relies on an absent analyst’s statements to support their opinion, and those statements are crucial for the opinion’s validity, they are effectively admitted for their truth. This triggers the Confrontation Clause because the defendant is denied the opportunity to challenge the veracity of critical assertions on which the expert’s testimony is based. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Arbitration
Smith v Spizzirri, 601 US 472 (2024)
In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 USC 1 et seq., when a dispute subject to arbitration is presented and one of the parties requests a stay of the proceedings under 9 USC 3, the district court must issue a stay and lacks the discretion to dismiss the suit. The case arose when petitioners, alleging violations of federal and state employment laws, filed suit in state court. The respondents removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Although the petitioners agreed to arbitration, they contended that §3 required the district court to stay the action rather than dismiss it. The district court compelled arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice, a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that §3’s plain text mandates a stay of proceedings upon request. The statutory language, using “shall,” imposes a non-discretionary obligation to stay the proceedings, which is defined as a temporary suspension of legal actions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the FAA’s structure and purpose support this interpretation, as staying a case aligns with the supervisory role envisioned for courts under the FAA and prevents triggering an immediate appeal that Congress intended to avoid. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts must stay proceedings when a dispute is arbitrable and a stay is requested under §3.
Administrative
Food and Drug Admin v Alliance for Hippocratic Med, 602 US 367 (2024)
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations on the abortion drug mifepristone. The FDA initially approved mifepristone in 2000, with subsequent regulatory changes in 2016 and 2021 aimed at expanding access and reducing procedural requirements. Plaintiffs, including pro-life medical associations and individual doctors opposed to abortion, sought to enjoin these FDA actions, alleging potential harms such as compromising doctors’ conscience rights and imposing economic burdens.
The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering mifepristone off the market. However, on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court found that while some plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain FDA actions, they could challenge the 2016 and 2021 regulatory changes. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. The Supreme Court rejected claims that relaxed FDA regulations would force doctors to violate their consciences or impose economic harm on them, citing existing legal protections for doctors in such cases. See 42 USC 300a-7(c)(1) and 1395dd. The Supreme Court also found that the alleged injuries were too speculative and not directly linked to the FDA’s regulatory actions. Additionally, organizational plaintiffs, such as medical associations, could not establish standing based solely on objections to FDA decisions or the costs incurred in response. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case, denying the plaintiffs the injunctive relief they sought against the FDA’s regulations on mifepristone.
Ohio v Environmental Prot Agency, 603 US ___, 144 S Ct 2040 (2024)
In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay, halting the enforcement of the EPA’s rule against the applicant-states. This case involved the Clean Air Act, which requires states to submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to manage air quality. The EPA disapproved over 20 SIPs and proposed a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to bind these states. However, during the public comment period, concerns were raised about the fairness and effectiveness of the FIP if not all states complied. Nonetheless, the EPA issued the final rule which stated that the plan would remain unchanged despite other states’ lack of participation. This led to legal challenges from states and industry groups, resulting in courts staying 12 of the SIP disapprovals. The remaining states and industry groups challenged the FIP in the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the EPA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. The D.C. Circuit initially denied relief, leading parties to appeal.
The Supreme Court found that the states’ challenge to the EPA’s final rule as arbitrary and capricious would likely prevail on the merits. The EPA did not reasonably address concerns about the cost-effectiveness of emissions reduction measures if fewer states participated due to court stays despite the comments made on the proposed FIP. Therefore, the enforcement of the EPA’s rule against the applicants shall be stayed pending litigation.
Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, Nos 22-451, 22-1219, ___ US ___ (June 28, 2024)
In a 6-3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the longstanding precedent of Chevron USA, Inc v National Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984), eliminating the requirement for judicial deference to executive agencies in interpreting agency-administered law. A group of commercial fishermen sued the National Marine Fisheries Service over a rule mandating industry-funded at-sea monitoring in the Atlantic herring fishery, arguing it exceeded the Service’s authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Act and violated rulemaking procedures. Applying Chevron, the district court ruled for the government, finding its interpretation reasonable and its rulemaking lawful. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that Article III of the U.S. Constitution and historical precedent underscore the judiciary’s ultimate responsibility to interpret laws, and that Chevron deference excessively defers to executive expertise. Further, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act in its plain text affirms courts’ authority to decide legal questions independently from agency interpretations, including those involving ambiguous laws, without mandating deference to agency interpretations of statutes. The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that agencies should resolve statutory ambiguities due to their subject matter expertise, the promotion of uniform federal law construction, and the belief that statutory ambiguities often involve policymaking better suited for a political branch, citing its statutory and historical analysis. Therefore, Chevron is overruled, the judgment of the D.C. Circuit was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Corner Post, Inc v Board of Governors of Fed Reserve Sys, 603 US ___, 144 S Ct 2440 (2024)
In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 6-year statute of limitations under 28 USC 2401(a) for bringing an action against a government agency under the Administrative Procedure Act begins running when the plaintiff incurs injury from the final agency action, as outlined in 5 USC 702 and 704. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Federal Reserve Board, challenging its regulation which standardized interchange fees for merchants as unlawful under 15 USC 1693o–2(a)(3)(A). The district court dismissed the claim under 28 USC 2401(a), concluding that the agency action was finalized in 2011, which means plaintiffs were time-barred from bringing this action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reasoned that the lower courts’ interpretations of the statute of limitations could not be squared with a plain reading of 5 USC 702, which requires a litigant to have suffered an injury, and 5 USC 704, which stipulates that judicial review is generally permissible only for final agency actions. The principle that an action does not “accrue” until a litigant suffers an injury is affirmed through congressional intent and historical interpretation of similar provisions. Therefore, the decision is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Labor
Starbucks Corp v McKinney, ___ US ___, 144 S Ct 1570 (2024)
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the four-factor test in Winter v Natural Res Def Council, Inc, 555 US 7 (2008), governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The case arose when a Tennessee Starbucks terminated six employees, including union organizers, who had conducted a news interview about their unionization efforts at the store after hours. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging violations under 29 USC 158(a)(1) and (3). Following an investigation, the NLRB issued a complaint against Starbucks, prompting the NLRB’s regional director to petition the district court for a preliminary injunction pending administrative proceedings, which included reinstating the terminated employees.
The district court applied a two-factor test established by Sixth Circuit precedent: (1) whether there was reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice had occurred, and (2) whether injunctive relief was just and proper. Based on this standard, the district court granted the injunction, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the district court applied the appropriate standard for granting preliminary injunctions under section 10(j) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court held that the Winter four-factor test must be applied, resolving a circuit split. This test requires a movant to demonstrate (1) a clear showing of likely success on the merits, (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of the equities tips in the movant’s favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. The Supreme Court rejected arguments advocating deference to the NLRB, emphasizing that section 10(j) does not preclude applying traditional equity principles which are exemplified in the Winter test. The decision sets a precedent for heightened judicial scrutiny of future section 10(j) injunction requests.
Second Amendment
United States v Rahimi, 602 US ___, 144 S Ct 1889 (2024)
In an 8–1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 18 USC 922(g)(8). This statute prohibits individuals under domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms, contingent upon the order meeting specific criteria. Respondent Zackey Rahimi contested the constitutionality of the statute, claiming that it violated the Second Amendment. Rahimi’s motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds was denied by the district court. However, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022), the Fifth Circuit reversed this decision, deeming the statute incompatible with historical norms of firearm regulation. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, finding that since the nation’s founding, firearm regulations have aimed to prevent individuals who pose credible threats of physical harm from possessing firearms, such as through “surety” and “going armed” laws. 18 USC 922(g)(8), requiring a court finding of such a threat before restricting firearm possession, aligns with this historical tradition. The Supreme Court emphasized that while the Second Amendment guarantees a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must be balanced against public safety interests.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court clarified that §922(g)(8) does not impose a blanket ban on firearm possession but targets specific individuals deemed dangerous by a court. This targeted approach, coupled with the temporary nature of the restriction tied to the duration of the restraining order, supports the statute’s constitutionality under the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court clarified that Bruen does not require a gun-restricting policy to have a “historical twin” but rather a “historical analogue,” to be constitutional. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of §922(g)(8), emphasizing its alignment with longstanding practices and its tailored approach to addressing public safety concerns associated with domestic violence.
Tax and Corporate
Connelly v United States, 602 US ___, 144 S Ct 1406 (2024)
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem shares does not offset the corporation’s value for federal estate tax purposes. Michael and Thomas Connelly, the sole shareholders of Crown C Supply, had an agreement that allowed the surviving brother to purchase the deceased brother’s shares, with Crown obligated to redeem the shares if the surviving brother declined. Crown had $3.5 million in life insurance on each brother to fund this obligation. After Michael’s death, Thomas chose not to buy Michael’s shares, triggering Crown’s obligation to redeem them for $3 million, which was paid to Michael’s estate. Thomas, as the executor, reported the shares’ value as $3 million on the estate’s tax return. During an IRS audit, an outside accounting firm valued Crown at $3.86 million, excluding the insurance proceeds used for the share redemption. Based on Michael’s 77.18 percent ownership, the firm calculated his shares’ value at about $3 million. The IRS disagreed, stating that Crown’s value should include the $3 million in life insurance proceeds, making the total value $6.86 million. This meant Michael’s shares were worth $5.3 million. The IRS assessed an additional $889,914 in taxes based on this higher value. The estate paid the deficiency and sued for a refund. The District Court ruled in favor of the IRS, holding that to accurately value Michael’s shares, the $3 million in life-insurance proceeds must be counted in Crown’s valuation, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court agreed and held that a corporation’s contractual obligation to redeem shares at fair market value does not offset the value of life insurance proceeds when calculating the federal estate tax. The Court reasoned that a hypothetical buyer would consider Crown’s fair market value to include the life insurance proceeds, resulting in a total value of $6.86 million at Michael’s death. Consequently, Michael’s shares, representing 77.18% ownership, were valued at $5.3 million. The Court concluded that the life insurance proceeds used for share redemption are a net asset and should not be excluded from Crown’s valuation. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit, holding that the IRS’s higher valuation and additional tax assessment were correct.
Moore v United States, 602 US ___, 144 S Ct 1680 (2024)
In a 7–2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) introduced by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The case centered on Charles and Kathleen Moore, shareholders in KisanKraft, an American-controlled foreign corporation that had amassed significant income from 2006 to 2017 without distributing it to shareholders. Following the MRT’s enactment, the Moores faced a tax liability of $14,729 on their pro rata share of KisanKraft’s accumulated income. They paid the tax and subsequently sued for a refund, arguing that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause of the Constitution because it taxed their shares without apportionment among the states.
The Supreme Court ruled that the MRT did not exceed Congress’s constitutional authority. It determined that the tax was on income rather than a direct tax on property, thus not requiring apportionment under the Direct Tax Clause. The Supreme Court relied on established precedents affirming Congress’s power to tax shareholders of entities like KisanKraft on their accumulated income. Additionally, the decision underscored Congress’s historical practice of taxing shareholders on undistributed income from various business entities, reinforcing the validity of the MRT. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision affirmed the MRT as a constitutionally permissible measure to tax income from American-controlled foreign corporations, accumulated over preceding years, without violating constitutional principles.
Bankruptcy
Harrington v Purdue Pharma LP, No 23-124, 603 US ___ (June 27, 2024)
In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that as part of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, Section 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC 1123(b), does not permit a release and injunction that effectively discharges claims against a non-debtor without the consent of affected claimants. Since the 1990s, Purdue Pharma, under the ownership of the Sackler family, marketed OxyContin as a less addictive opioid pain reliever during the prescription opioid crisis. Concerned about impending litigation, the Sacklers withdrew approximately $11 billion from Purdue Pharma over a decade, severely weakening the company financially. In 2019, Purdue Pharma filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Sacklers proposed a reorganization plan seeking immunity for themselves from future opioid-related claims in exchange for a $4.3 billion payment. The bankruptcy court approved, but the district court vacated, asserting that bankruptcy courts lacked the authority to discharge non-debtor claims without consent.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that while §1123(b)(6) allows for additional provisions not expressly forbidden by the Bankruptcy Code, it should be interpreted narrowly in line with its context, which focuses on adjustments related to the debtor’s rights and responsibilities and does not grant authority to discharge non-debtor debts without affected claimants’ consent. The Supreme Court also found that the discharge worked against the framework of the statute and congressional intent. The bankruptcy reserves discharge for debtors who fully disclose their assets and excludes claims for fraud or willful injury, highlighting that the Sacklers’ attempt to discharge claims, including fraud or willful injury, without filing for bankruptcy circumvents these statutory limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s judgment, holding that the bankruptcy code does not permit a release and injunction in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan to discharge claims against a non-debtor without affected claimants’ consent, remanding the case for further proceedings.
First Amendment
Moody v NetChoice, LLC, ___US___, 144 S Ct 2383 (2024) and NetChoice, LLC v Paxton, ___US___, 144 S Ct 2383 (2024)
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit Courts failed to conduct a proper First Amendment analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges from trade associations subject to Florida and Texas social media regulation laws. In 2021, Florida and Texas enacted laws specifying how large social media companies must engage in content moderation and requiring explanations for post removals or alterations. In two separate lawsuits challenging the law in each state, both district courts issued preliminary injunctions. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction, holding that Florida’s content moderation law triggers heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction of the Texas law, finding that the law did not affect speech under the First Amendment, that the state had a right to advance the law in the interest of protecting diverse ideas, and that the law did not impose an undue burden on the social media companies.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court established that facial challenges under the First Amendment require a showing that a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional relative to its legitimate objectives. The lower courts’ analyses improperly focused on limited circumstances without fully addressing the breadth of activities covered by the laws or adequately balancing constitutional and unconstitutional applications. Further, the Supreme Court clarified that the First Amendment protects entities that compile and curate others’ speech into their own expressive content from being forced to include messages they wish to exclude. Citing precedent, the Supreme Court found that a better balancing of ideas is not a strong enough argument for curtailing these entities’ activities. Based on this, Texas’s law is unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Therefore, the decisions in both cases are vacated and remanded for proper First Amendment analysis as outlined in this opinion.
Presidential Immunity
Trump v United States, 603 US ___, 144 S Ct 2312 (2024)
In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, a former president is entitled to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his exclusive constitutional authority and at least presumptive immunity for all official acts. This landmark decision addresses the scope of presidential power and immunity from prosecution for actions taken during a presidency.
A federal grand jury indicted former president Donald J. Trump on four counts for his actions following the November 2020 presidential election, alleging that he conspired to overturn the election results by spreading false claims of election fraud. Trump’s motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds of presidential immunity was denied by the district court and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that separation of powers principles necessitate presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for a president’s acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities. This immunity is essential to safeguard the Executive Branch’s independence and enables the president to perform constitutional duties without undue caution, unless the government can prove that prosecuting an official act poses no risk to executive authority and functions.
Before determining immunity, the Supreme Court must analyze whether the conduct being prosecuted falls within the president’s official constitutional and statutory authority. The Supreme Court held that Trump’s alleged attempts to use the Justice Department to support election fraud claims were within his presidential powers, granting him absolute immunity for these actions. It also found that his conversations with the vice president about allegedly altering the January 6 certification results were part of his official duties, granting him presumptive immunity. The lower court’s decision is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the nature of Trump’s other actions and to allow the government to respond to the Supreme Court’s grant of presumptive immunity.
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